

Senate Select C. Intel.

This paper was prepared by

on 24 Jan 75.

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Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000500110100-7

Considerations Regarding the Selection and Briefing
of Staff Members of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations

The Senate Resolution establishing the Select Committee grants virtually unlimited scope and authority to the Committee to probe into the most sensitive categories of information and activities of the CIA and other member agencies of the U. S. intelligence community. This unprecedented investigation of the U. S. intelligence community imposes a special and solemn responsibility on the Committee staff members to protect sensitive sources, methods, and information entrusted to them from unauthorized disclosure.

Past experience indicates that ad hoc committees intended to function for a limited period of time soon become major sources of leaks to the press, most often from carelessly selected staff members who turn out to have political axes to grind or who wish to ingratiate themselves with the press. It is therefore incumbent upon the Select Committee to choose its staff members with the utmost care and diligence. Just as was the procedure for the selection of Committee members, only persons who have not become "polarized," either for or against intelligence operations, should be chosen as staff members. Whether or not the Select Committee becomes a "leaking sieve" will depend on the integrity, objectivity, and intellectual discipline of the staff members. It would, of course, be most

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harmful to the credibility of the investigation and its conclusions if staff members are found to have a record of bias or favoritism towards the CIA or other intelligence agencies that may come within the purview of the investigation.

In addition to the selection of staff members on the basis of integrity and nonpartisanship, it is important that staff members be experienced in the handling of classified materials. They should also have demonstrated that they are capable of taking seriously the responsibility for safeguarding classified information.

The name of each prospective staff member should be submitted to the appropriate Federal agencies for a full security clearance and he should not be permitted to handle classified material until a security clearance is secured.

After receiving a security clearance, each prospective staff member should be required to sign a secrecy agreement pledging not to reveal, either during the hearings or at any time in the future, to unauthorized persons, any classified information entrusted to him. The secrecy agreement should stipulate that violations of the pledge would subject the individual to a citation for contempt of Congress.

In consultation with CIA, rules and procedures should be drawn up to regulate the care, circulation, temporary and permanent storage and disposition of transcripts of testimony as well as any documents, files, or

other classified materials made available by the intelligence agencies to the Select Committee as evidence. These rules and procedures should be in writing and each staff member should be required to certify in writing that he has read, fully comprehends, and will adhere to these regulations for safeguarding classified materials. Arrangements should be made for each staff member to be given special briefings by the CIA and other intelligence agencies on any matters of importance peculiar to the handling of materials from each intelligence agency that is likely to provide classified materials to the Select Committee.

It should be the responsibility of the Chief of the Select Committee Staff, aided by full-time professional security officers, to assure that security rules are rigidly enforced. Staff members who turn out to be unwilling or unable to comply with these rules should be dismissed without delay.

As important as security procedures may be to the orderly management of sensitive intelligence materials, these will be of limited effectiveness unless the staff members selected are persons of proven integrity, nonpartisanship, and intellectual discipline.

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Date: 22 Jan
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Select Committee File

UP-039

ADD 1 CIA, WASHINGTON (UP-015)

TWO CONSERVATIVES, TWO LIBERALS AND ONE MODERATE WERE NAMED TODAY AS THE REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL SENATE COMMITTEE.

NAMED AS WERE CONSERVATIVE SENS. JOHN TOWER, TEX., AND BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.; LIBERALS CHARLES MATHIAS, MD., AND RICHARD SCHWEIKER, PA., AND MODERATE HOWARD BAKER, TENN.

SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER HUGH SCOTT APPOINTED THE REPUBLICAN MEMBERS. MANSFIELD STILL MUST NAME SIX DEMOCRATS TO SERVE ON THE 11-MEMBER PANEL.

TOWER WILL SERVE AS THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PANEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. TOWER EARLIER TOLD NEWSMEN HE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT.

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Comment

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

EX-100

25-360

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Legislative Counsel

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DATE

24 January 1975

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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Director

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We have talked with Ed Braswell regarding our concern about the problem of access by temporary employees of the Select Committee to sensitive Agency information. Ed said he thought Stennis would like to discuss this with Senators Tower and Goldwater and asked us for a paper on the subject. The attached was prepared in the main by [redacted] and I think does a good job of stating the problem without getting into personalities. A copy was given to Ed today for use without attribution to CIA.

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George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel

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